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 Thomas Demmelhuber 
The European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and its Implementation in the 
Southern Mediterranean  
The Case of Egypt 
“Arab states succeeded in convincing the European partner of the Arab vision 
regarding the issue of reform and the Arab states' rejection of any external at-
tempts to interfere in their domestic affairs. The reform process will take place 
in Arab states in a way that suits each country's historical, cultural and social 
context.”
1 
Bridging the gap 
The promotion of democracy as an internationally recognised foreign pol-
icy objective is in critical condition. The continuing war on terror in Af-
ghanistan and elsewhere, the on-going civil war in Iraq which shows no 
signs of ending, the prompt isolation of a democratically elected Palestinian 
government and the vivid «duckling» of the West in terms of the unsolved 
democracy vs. stability dilemma have damaged the credibility of democ-
racy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean. The act of promoting de-
mocracy is currently outdated. During conversations with government 
 
The author thanks Michelle Pace, Bo Ram Kwon, Andreas Marchetti, Stefan Krompaß, 
Jens Kutscher and Rafael Raum for their valuable comments on the manuscript. 
1   Statement by H.E. Ahmed Abul-Gheit, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, cf. 
Magda el-Ghitany, «Ten Years On», in: al-Ahram weekly, 2-8 June 2005, 
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officials and civil society actors in the Southern Mediterranean alike, reac-
tions of denial are most likely when talking about political conditionality, 
e.g. from the EU in promoting the rule of law, good governance, and de-
mocracy in its Southern neighbourhood. At least rhetorically, rule of law, 
good governance, and democratic reform processes are based on a common 
interest but both parties are following a differing agenda of objectives on 
the ground. EU-Egyptian relations are deeply shaped by a differing under-
standing of democratic reform with both actors following an agenda of dif-
ferent priorities. 
Regarding this perception gap the following paper aims at analysing a 
Southern perspective (here: the case of Egypt) on the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP) in order to draw conclusions for the EU’s foreign policy 
objectives. In particular, after being in place for more than two years, a 
critical assessment of the reception of this new EU initiative is of utmost 
importance if one only considers more than 15 months of difficult negotia-
tions for the EU-Egyptian «Action Plan».
2 What are the reasons on behalf 
of Egypt for these obstacles compared to the smooth negotiations for the 
«Action Plans» with Morocco, Tunisia or Jordan? Analysing the Southern 
perspective on the ENP, keeping in mind the complexity among Arab 
Mediterranean partner countries (MPC), one is obliged to do specific case 
studies for all involved MPCs in order to find commonalities among them 
and eventually get the grand picture for the Southern perspective. The 
scope of this paper would not be sufficient for such an extensive study. Fol-
lowing the ENP statute of multiple and differentiated bilateralism this pa-
per focuses solely on the Egyptian perspective. 
 
2   January 2007 has seen an agreement concerning the disputes over the language of 
certain parts and aspects of the «Action Plan». Following information of the EC 
Delegation in Cairo, the document is going to be ready for signature in March 2007. The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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The ENP's general approach and its genuine interests 
The enlargement round of the European Union with ten new members
3 in 
May 2004 created a two-fold challenge for the EU. Domestically it implied 
a new institutional and socio-political challenge both in terms of institu-
tional capacity and the necessity to sharpen the EU’s identity among its 
populations to mitigate scepticism, particularly in those countries bordering 
the new member states.
4 As a new geopolitical reality which incorporates 
the aforementioned enlargement round and the upcoming rounds (the Bal-
kans
5 and Turkey), the EU faces a new and possibly final external border. 
Rising from the latter the EU made an assessment that the most successful 
foreign policy instrument, i.e. the incentive of future membership, must be 
substituted for a new definition of incentives. Only a couple of days after 
the celebrations for the enlargement round in May 2004, the EU Commis-
sion presented a strategy paper incorporating a framework with basic prin-
ciples for a new neighbourhood policy.
6 Mentioning the central interest to 
be surrounded by a ring of friends, the EU tries to associate new 
neighbours by offering them a deepening of cooperation and an upgrading 
of relations in contrast to the periphery beyond those newly defined target 
 
3    The three Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Malta and Cyprus. 
4    EOS Gallup Europe, Enlargement of the European Union, Flash Eurobarometer 
140, Brussels 2003. The same accounts for the latest enlargement round with Bul-
garia and Romania on January 1, 2007. 
5   Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania have recognized member-
ship perspectives. Croatia and Macedonia have gained the status of accession can-
didates (cf. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm> January 27, 2007). 
6   Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission. 
European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper, Com (2004) 373 final, Brussels 
2004. Apart from the latter there were also other driving forces for this new policy 
proposal following former initiatives such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
in 2003, which emphasized “that even in an era of globalisation, geography is im-
portant” and that “it is in the European interest that countries on our borders are 
well-governed.” (cf. The Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World – The European Security Strategy, Brussels 2003, p. 7). Regarding the 
ESS the EU stressed that it is one of its genuine interests to support sustainable re-
form processes aimed at promoting stability in the region surrounding the EU. 
Based on this assumption the ENP may be called the regional policy consequence 
of the global framework as laid down in the ESS. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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countries.
7 As a consequence, one may argue that by embarking on this 
new policy initiative the EU has created a new «semi-periphery».
8 It en-
compasses such diverse regions like Eastern Europe, where the final ques-
tion on possible memberships has not been answered yet, and the Southern 
and Eastern Mediterranean shaped by a complex political, economic, and 
cultural heterogeneity. On behalf of the EU the common denominator of 
these diverse countries and regions – making it the target of a common pol-
icy initiative – is their geopolitical meaning for the EU whereas for the new 
neighbourhood’s countries the common sense may lie in their expected mo-
tivation to embark on the EU’s offer for closer cooperation. In other words, 
for the EU the «win-win-situation» consists of security and stability on its 
borders by fostering trade and the spread of its values, whereas for the 
partner countries it brings even closer cooperation and – among others – a 
possible stake in the internal market.  
The central instruments of the ENP are bilateral «Action Plans» based on 
prior existing «Cooperation and Partnership Agreements» with Eastern 
European countries and «Association Agreements» put in place through the 
framework of the Barcelona Process, i.e. the «Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship» (EMP). The «Action Plans»
9 are mutually negotiated, resulting in 
country-specific working programmes that outline specific medium- and 
long-term agendas of political and economic reforms («benchmarking»). 
 
7   Cf. central documents for the genesis of the ENP: Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations 
with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Com (2003) 104 final, Brussels 2003; 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission. 
Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, Com (2003) 393 final, Brus-
sels 2003; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper, Com (2004) 373 
final, Brussels 2004; The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on 
European Neighbourhood Policy, 10189/04 (Press 195), Luxembourg 2004, pp. 11-
14; The Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 17/18 June 
2004 – Presidency Conclusions, 10679/2/04 REV 2, Brussels 2004, p. 14. 
8   Cf. for a discussion of the term «semi-periphery» and its basic geopolitical mean-
ing, Andreas Marchetti, «The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at 
the EU’s Periphery», in: ZEI Discussion Paper, C158, Bonn 2006.  The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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The EU avoids any general approach and embarks on a bilateral differenti-
ated approach (despite the recognition of a possible regional track). Going 
beyond the former approach of negative conditionality
10, meaning the pos-
sible suspension of elements of the «Association Agreements», the EU now 
pursues a model of positive conditionality by granting more aid to those 
actors being fast in the implementation of their «Action Plan» («govern-
ance facility»).
11 As Fernandez and Youngs called it, through the “every-
thing except the institutions” logic, the EU offers a vast array of possible 
benefits.
12 In principle, the EU offers a possible stake in the internal mar-
ket, a deepening of the trade relations, an integration into EU networks in 
the fields of transport, telecommunication, and energy, support for more 
foreign direct investment (FDI), support for consecutive integration into the 
global market, financial and technical aid for migration, a fostered coopera-
tion of the judiciary (including EUROPOL & EUROJUST), and coopera-
tion in border-control, combating organised crime and drug trafficking.
13 
Regarding the financial framework, January 2007 has seen the beginning of 
the new «European Neighbourhood Policy and Partnership Instrument» 
(ENPI) with a total amount of € 11.181 billion of which 95 per cent shall 
be allocated to country-specific forms of cooperation for the financial pe-
 
9   Another precondition is the draft of a «Country Report» which is similar to those 
«Country Strategy Reports» drafted under the EMP framework. 
10  Previously it was the EU (i.e. the member states in the Council), who could in the-
ory and still may suspend concessions and measures of cooperation as granted in 
the «Association Agreement». Keeping in mind that it has never happened so far, 
the stakes for suspension are high and the political repercussions uncertain. It needs 
an initiative put forward by the European Commission, agreed on by the Council 
with a qualified majority vote (QMV). 
11  € 300 million will be set aside to provide additional support to those partner coun-
tries which have made most progress in implementing their «Action Plans» (Press 
release of the EU-Commission’s Delegation to Cairo, Egypt and the European Un-
ion - Shared Past, Common Future. Strengthening the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, December 4, 2006, Cairo).  
12  Richard Youngs / Haizam Amirah Fernandez, «Introduction», in: Richard Youngs / 
Haizam Amirah Fernandez (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing 
the First Decade, Madrid 2005, p. 17. 
13  Commission of the European Communities, Com (2004) 373 final, [Fn. 6], pp. 12-
23. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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riod from 2007 to 2013.
14 ENPI merges former instruments such as 
MEDA
15 for the Mediterranean, TACIS
16 for Eastern Europe or the 
EIDHR
17 and reduces its financial instruments from previously more than 
30 to six.
18 Additionally, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has recently 
renewed its mandate for external lending in the Mediterranean and Eastern 
Europe, i.e. in the newly defined European neighbourhood. Similar to the 
ENPI with almost 70 per cent allocated to the Mediterranean, about 60 per 
cent, in total € 8.7 billion, shall be allocated to Mediterranean countries.
19 
The ENP is a security and stability policy aimed at promoting wealth and 
democratisation. Specifically, with the decision to include the MPCs in the 
ENP as a complementary part and a strengthening effort of the EMP, the 
EU showed commitment to the recognition that there is need to pursue and 
to further upgrade the bilateral track to fulfil the provisions of the new 
agenda, which is similar to the provisions of the EMP but stricter, more 
rigorous and concrete in its national approach. In terms of the Mediterra-
nean this multiple bilateralism shows recognition by the EU to the notion 
that the Mediterranean and its conflict-woven subparts consist of independ-
ent national actors which still challenge any unifying idea and therefore 
still thwart any multilateral approach.
20 Upgrading the bilateral track also 
 
14  Council of the European Union, Council Approves Financing Instrument to Provide 
More than EUR 11 Billion for European Neighbourhood Policy, 14087/06 (Press 
292), Luxembourg 2006.  
15  Mésures d’accompagnement financiers et techniques. 
16  Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
17  European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. 
18  Commission of the European Communities, On the Instruments of External Assis-
tance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013, Com (2004) 626 final, 
Brussels 2004, pp. 7-10. 
19  The Council of the European Union, Council Agrees on Renewed Mandate for Ex-
ternal Lending by the European Investment Bank, 15787/06 (Press 339), Brussels 
2006.  
20  Cf. European Commission – DG Press and Communication, Speech by EU Com-
missioner on External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy at the «Con-
férence des Organes Spécialisés en Affaires Communautaires», Speech 06/325, 
Vienna, May 22, 2006. During the last decade, with the Middle East Peace Process 
turning out to be in severe trouble, the multilateral track of the EMP remained alive 
in theory but in fact it was the bilateral track that allocated the vast majority of the 
funds committed to the region. The bilateral track was the only functioning and vi-The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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reflects the interests of the MPCs (here: Egypt) in the South despite regular 
callings for intra-Arab integration, which is proceeding slowly and gradu-
ally. The point of reference still remains a deep-rooted sense of national 
identity that puts possible merits for the nation state on the top of the 
agenda. The stereotypical Western approach considers Arab common sense 
to be shaped by religion, culture, and currently by religious-inspired vio-
lence while in fact the Arab approach – taking the cultural factor as granted 
– is much more focused on the ideal of a political entity put forward by 
Arab Nationalism. Indeed, there is a connecting cultural factor across the 
Arab world resulting from religion, custom, and common descent. But in 
terms of daily politics Arab unity remains a rather unrealistic vision due to 
the lack of commitment to integrate and the lack of credibility and feasibil-
ity among all Arab countries to undertake sustainable integration on a po-
litical scale. Moreover it is simply the extent of heterogeneity let alone the 
common factors that (still) make any discussion on regional unity futile.
21 
Sustainable development for the region will rather depend on the successful 
integration into the global market (among others such as fighting poverty), 
therefore putting the search for partners high on the agenda of each single 
state in the region. The same accounts for the Arab MPCs that are part of 
the EMP/ENP.
22 Based on this assumption and regarding the objectives of 
the EMP/ENP, as stated earlier in this paper, it must be in the interest of 
both sides of the Mediterranean to embark on this effort of reciprocal inte-
gration. Looking at the perception of the EMP and the ENP alike by the 
Egyptian regime there is a striking mood of concern challenging the poten-
tial benefits of reciprocal integration. 
 
able dimension of the EMP. For further information on that issue cf. Euromed In-
formation Notes, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA Regional Activities, 
Brussels 2005, pp. 13ff. 
21  Cf. for a valuable discussion of these varying perceptions in the Mediterranean re-
gion, Michelle Pace, «The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the For-
eign Policy of the European Union», in: Journal of European Area Studies, vol. 10, 
n°2 (2002). 
22  Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya (so far only ENP), Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Au-
thority, Lebanon and Syria. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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EMP vs. ENP and Egyptian concerns 
With regard to the official stance of the Egyptian government, there is a 
fear that the Barcelona Process might be diluted by the new ENP initiative. 
In conversations with Egyptian negotiators and academics alike a wide-
spread lack of comprehension is heard why the EU embarks on a new pol-
icy initiative only two and a half years after the ratification of the «Associa-
tion Agreement» under the EMP banner.
23 The official agenda of the ENP 
in the Mediterranean framework, which is based on the Agreement and 
tries to enhance and strengthen the implementation of the latter, is not con-
sidered. The fear of being sidelined in the new foreign policy of the EU is 
built on the assumption that for Eastern European countries a small hope of 
a future membership remains, while the Mediterranean countries do not 
have such perspective, thus making them second-class partners. Even the 
fact that more than two thirds of the committed funds are directed to the 
Mediterranean partner countries up till 2013 does not mitigate the criticism. 
Regarding the fact that the EMP remains intact under the wider framework 
of the ENP, one of the reasons for Egypt’s cautious and in parts reluctant 
approach may lie in the policy shift towards more positive conditionality by 
the EU, as put forward by Javier Solana: 
“We want to continue using Europe’s power to attract, stabilize and transform. 
EU enlargement is an amazing success story, creating a widening area of 
freedom, democracy and stability. […] The guiding principle of our European 
 
23  Interview with Amb. Nihad Abdel-Latif, Secretary-General of the Permanent Secre-
tariat of European-Egyptian Association Agreement, November 5, 2006; Confer-
ence proceedings of «Egyptian-European Economy Forum», held at the 
International Centre for Future and Strategic Studies (Cairo) on October 31, 2006 
and Conference on «From Partnership to Neighbourhood. New Paths to a Success-
ful Euro-Mediterranean Future», at Nile Hilton (Cairo) on November 7, 2006; Con-
ference coverage of al-Ahram daily and weekly newspaper: Khalifa Adha, «12 
miliyar euru musa’ada urubbiyya khilala as-sanawat as-sab’a al-muqbila 69% min-
ha li-duwal al-mintaqa», in: al-Ahram, November 8, 2006; Fatamah Farag, «Love 
Thy Neighbour», in: al-Ahram weekly, 9-15 November 2006, 819/2006; Sherine 
Nasr, «Partnership Revisited», in: al-Ahram weekly, 16-22 November 2006, 
820/2006. The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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neighbourhood policy is that those countries that advance faster on the path of 
reform will be rewarded with closer relations with the union.”
24 
Regarding the failed attempt of more than one decade to link economic 
support to the promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and sus-
tainable reforms under the «Association Agreements», the EU has gone a 
step further. Firstly, the ENP recognizes the necessary country-specific ap-
proach in order to be more flexible but more specific in rewarding possible 
reform efforts.
25 Secondly, based on this differentiated bilateralism and ex-
perience with enlargement, the EU seems to be ready to offer a «real car-
rot» to dilute the impression that it prefers stability over democratisation 
and reform. This new initiative is at the centre of the argument that the 
ENP strengthens the EMP as it eventually establishes a real opportunity to 
foster the envisaged cross-pillar functioning of the EMP that aims at sup-
porting sustainable transformation processes in the region.
26 
ENP and Egypt – an Overview 
Considering the fact that the prospective «Action Plan» is based on for-
merly concluded bilateral agreements, one has to look at the genesis of the 
EU-Egyptian «Association Agreement» as the legal basis of EU-Egyptian 
relations, signed after five years of negotiations in Luxembourg on June 25, 
2001. The main objectives of the «Association Agreements» are to 
strengthen the links between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in order 
to establish long-lasting relationships, based on reciprocity, solidarity, part-
nership, and co-development.
27 Regarding the ENP, the Commission pre-
 
24  Javier Solana, «Europe’s Leading Role in the Spread of Democracy», in: Financial 
Times, March 14, 2005. 
25  Cf. Fn. 11. 
26  The EMP, based on the Barcelona Declaration of the year 1995, consists of three 
pillars: [1] Political & Security Partnership [2] Economic & Financial Partnership 
[3] Social, Human and Cultural Partnership. 
27  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament. Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human 
Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners – Strategic Guidelines, 
Com (2003) 294 final, Brussels 2003, p. 2. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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pares «Country Reports»
28– in practice similar to previous «Country Strat-
egy Reports» with its «National Indicative Programme» under the EMP 
framework – assessing precisely the political and economic situation as 
well as institutional aspects in order to benchmark a prospective deepening 
of EU-Egyptian relations. The speed and intensity of this deepening phase 
shall depend on the will and capability of Egypt to engage in this broad 
agenda by fulfilling the mutually agreed tasks of the «Action Plan». More-
over it shall then be the task of Egypt to decide whether to follow those in-
centives put forward by the «Action Plan» in order to qualify for more EU 
support, mutual cooperation, and integration. Notwithstanding those offers 
and incentives, the EU remains vague about the framework of this possible 
enhanced partnership if the «Action Plans» are implemented. It seems as if 
the EU intentionally created some kind of diplomatic room for manoeuvre 
in order to adapt to possible future scenarios not yet predictable at this early 
point of the new policy initiative. Apart from that, by preserving room for 
diplomatic action the EU is likely to pay tribute to the complexity among 
the ring of states neighbouring the EU. On the one hand in Eastern Europe 
the last decision on possible EU memberships has not yet been drawn.
29 On 
the other hand the potential of inter-state conflicts and the longevity of au-
thoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean remain a heavy burden that makes 
any long-term strategy on behalf of the EU more difficult. 
Differing Perceptions 
Officially, the «bible» of the European Commission’s Delegation to Egypt 
is based on the Barcelona Process but the current focus is shifted towards 
the ENP with efforts channelled to complete the EU-Egyptian «Action 
Plan». By the end of 2006 ninety-nine per cent of the «Action Plan» were 
ready but the finalization throughout 2006 turned out to be tricky and over-
loaded with diplomatic manoeuvres, particularly on the Egyptian side. 
 
28  «Country Report Egypt», Com (2005) 72 final. 
29  Cf. for this aspect the EU-Ukraine Summit in October 2006: Dan Bilefsky, «EU 
Not Ready to Invite Ukraine to Join the Bloc», in: International Herald Tribune, Oc-
tober 17, 2006. The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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January 2007 has finally seen an agreement concerning the disputes over 
the language of certain parts and aspects of the «Action Plan».
30 During 
interviews, Egyptian negotiators claimed that the EU wanted to impose its 
model in a region that was completely different to Eastern Europe. From 
their point of view the EU should accompany the reform process but refrain 
from imposing the agenda in a language that implies a master-servant at-
mosphere while further diluting the EMP.
31 Negotiations on the «Action 
Plan» have been going on for more than 15 months and the initial intention 
to finish the document by the end of 2006 (originally planned for the end of 
2005) was far from realistic from both sides.
32 Numerous interviews with 
Egyptian representatives of the political and business sector have shown 
the lack of knowledge on behalf of the Egyptian side regarding the ENP.
33 
Moreover, the EMP as a matter of fact in daily operations, interactions with 
European partners and in particular for those being engaged in the export 
market still remains the primary framework of cooperation.  
Considering the coverage in the Egyptian press,
34 the Barcelona Process is 
still much more featured than the ENP.  The bottom line of those rather few 
 
30  This is the common denominator of various conversations held with representatives 
of the European Commission’s Delegation to Egypt/Cairo, held by the author in the 
second half of 2006. Additionally, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU is an on-going process with many involved actors thus making it 
difficult to find a common stance on certain things. The latter may also delay deci-
sion making.  
31  Cf. Interview with Amb. Nihad Abdel-Latif [Fn. 23]. 
32   Following information of the EC Delegation in Cairo, the signature shall be in 
March 2007. For further information on the negotiations, cf. Dina Ezzat / Niveen 
Wahish, «Out in the Cold», in: al-Ahram weekly, 12-18 May 2005, 742/2005. 
33  Former Member of Parliament (2000-2005) and former Sub-Governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Egypt, Dr. Faika El-Refaie, supported this argument during the «Egyp-
tian-European Economy Forum», held at the International Centre for Future and 
Strategic Studies (Cairo) on October 31, 2006.  
34  The Egyptian Press is very complex and diverse. It may be subdivided into four 
categories: [1] semi-official Egyptian-based papers with the state owning approxi-
mately one half of it (e.g.: al-Ahram) [2] opposition i.e. party papers – Egyptian-
based (e.g.: al-Wafd) [3] privately-owned and independent papers – Egyptian-based 
(e.g.: al-Masri al-Yowm) [4] privately-owned but foreign-based papers (e.g.: ad-
Dustour). The chief editors and the holders of leading positions in state-owned 
newspapers and media authorities are appointed by the Supreme Council of the Thomas Demmelhuber 
14   
articles is fear that the ENP is risking to further dilute the Barcelona Proc-
ess.
35 In addition, those minor reports on the ENP continue to be mostly 
restricted to government-loyal newspapers, in which they are most likely to 
be placed in the economic section, therefore undermining the overall more 
politically-based approach of the ENP, i.e. the linkage of political and eco-
nomic reforms with the commitment to cooperation.
36 The rare coverage by 
the fractured opposition press agrees in demanding of the EU to articulate 
binding reform benchmarks in approaching the Egyptian scene in order to 
speed up the slow and selective reform process.
37 That would be in line 
with the ENP and its «Action Plans» but it needs to be added that the latter 
is a narrow path of common sense. Many among the opposition press have 
severe doubts concerning the serious commitment of the EU to promote 
democracy. Others wonder about the real (conspiring) intentions. However 
binding reform benchmarks remain the clear red line for the overwhelming 
majority of both secular and Islamist actors as laid down by the opposition 
press. 
Whereas the EU wants to enhance an interdependent political and eco-
nomic agenda, the Egyptian regime shows only minor enthusiasm for the 
political reform agenda set forth by the EU. The understanding of political 
reform is far from being a common conviction and vision. For the last years 
 
Press, associated to the regime-dominated upper house of parliament, Maglis as-
Shura (cf.: § 211 Egyptian Constitution). Opposition papers and privately-owned 
independent papers (both Egyptian-based) though not subject to direct censorship 
are far more dependent on resources, have to be more focused on the specific target 
group and pursue some kind of self-censorship on certain issues (e.g. direct criti-
cism of the presidential family remains a taboo). Privately-owned and foreign-based 
papers are subject to prior censorship by the Ministry of Information.  
35  Cf. Niveen Wahish, «Questioning Barcelona», in: al-Ahram weekly, 21-27 April 
2005, 739/2005. 
36  Cf. the news coverage of the Conference on November 7, 2006 (Cairo), «From 
Partnership to Neighbourhood: New Paths to a Successful Euro-Mediterranean Fu-
ture» in the semi-official al-Ahram (al-Ahram, November 8, 2006, [Fn. 23]. 
37  The author refers to general comments on external democracy promotion. Apart 
from that, cf. the long interview with former Egyptian chief negotiator (negotiations 
on «Association Agreement») Amb. Gamal Bayumi (in: al-Wafd, October 28, 
2006) to learn that most topics rally around Arab economic integration with only 
two questions on the possible benefits arising out of the EU-Egyptian «Association 
Agreement».  The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
  15
Egypt has embarked on tremendous economic and political reforms but one 
has to question the substantial content of the latter and its compliance with 
EU principles. The EU’s approach to reform is directed towards sustainable 
liberalisation aiming at democratisation. In fact, reform policies in Egypt 
have been a masterpiece in avoiding liberalisation. In the political sector, 
reform policies that did not threaten the status quo were initiated, whereas 
the tremendous reforms and privatisation efforts in the economy led to no 
liberalisation.
38 Moreover the business sector set up by technocrats of a few 
family-based business tycoons (e.g. Orascom Company Holding or Man-
sour Group)
39 has gained incredible power within the ruling elite
40 by bene-
fiting from the increase in EU-Egyptian trade and by getting influential 
seats in the cabinet or in parliament. On behalf of Egypt, economic devel-
opment based on a long-term Industrial Development Strategy has utmost 
priority.
41 Economic cooperation in order to boost domestic growth and to 
attract FDI shapes Egyptian efforts while only reluctantly embarking on the 
political agenda.
42 It remains to be seen and shall be subject of evaluation 
 
38  Kienle called it «the Grand Delusion», cf. Eberhard Kienle, The Grand Delusion. 
Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, London / New York 2000. 
39  For instance the Orascom Company Holding of the Coptic Sawiris-Family includes 
three branches consisting of a telecommunication (OTH), construction (OCI) and 
tourist company (OHD), each belonging to one of the three sons of Onsi Sawiris, 
the founding father of Orascom in the 1980s. For a further insight into this so-called 
«crony capitalism», cf. Clement M. Henry / Robert Springborg, Globalization and 
the Politics of Development in the Middle East, Cambridge University Press 2001, 
pp. 134-167. 
40    Cf. opposition press article: Ahmed Fakri, «Maglis idara al-gam’iyya al-lati 
tahkumu misr», in: al-Ghad, October 29, 2006. 
41  Cf. Ministry of Industry & Technology (Arab Republic of Egypt), Egypt’s Indus-
trial Development Strategy. Industry: The Engine of Growth, Cairo 2005 (unpub-
lished version). 
42   The latest selling of 80 per cent of the former public Bank of Alexandria (BoA) to 
the Italian investment group San Paolo revealed that the paid sum of LE 9.2 billion 
(about € 1.3 billion) – celebrated as FDI by various ministries – was immediately 
circumvented for public debt services. Certainly, it is a legitimate action to spend 
the money on public debt service but one has to keep in mind that the government 
invested a huge amount of money to settle non-profit-loans (NPL) of the former 
public bank. Market analysts estimate that the government spent more money to get 
the bank ready for privatisation than it actually received in the end (cf. Sherine Ab-
del-Razek «Going Italian», in: al-Ahram weekly, 19-25 October 2006, 817/2006).  Thomas Demmelhuber 
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after the successful finalization of the «Action Plan» and the then following 
regular evaluation of implementation to be undertaken by a subcommittee 
of the «Association Council»
43 if the Egyptian stance on that view, driven 
by the transformative power of the latter, is subject to change.
44  
Summing up, the central flaw of EU-Egyptian relation is differing under-
standing of reform rising from the still missing mutual understanding after 
eleven years of partnership. On behalf of the EU, reform is directed to-
wards sustainable liberalisation aiming at democratisation. The ruling elite 
in Egypt has embarked on a reform process but adheres to its own under-
standing of it, which is gradualism and a top-down approach, fully in line 
with furthering the power structure of the ruling elite and neglecting any 
true political and economic liberalism. 
Searching for Reasons 
The reasons for Egypt’s cautious approach towards more commitment on 
political reforms can be seen as two-fold. Primarily, one has learned to live 
with the EMP and to get the best out of it while adhering to the domestic 
power structure. The Barcelona Process has created space for dialogue and 
cooperation but has not served as a «wind of change» in the region.
45 Dur-
ing the first decade, after a long warm-up period with MEDA II (2000-
2006) and the finalization of the «Association Agreement», Egypt bene-
fited increasingly from the partnership.
46 By pointing regularly at the Bar-
 
43  The «Association Council» is the highest forum of interaction and evaluation of the 
«Association Agreement», implemented by the latter (here: EU-Egyptian «Associa-
tion Agreement», Title VIII, § 74). 
44  Cf. European Commission – DG Press and Communication, Speech 06/325, [Fn. 
20]; Michelle Pace, «The Construction of EU Normative Power», in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, September 2007 (forthcoming). 
45  Cf. for a further insight into that issue: Andreas Jacobs / Hanspeter Mattes, Un-
politische Partnerschaft. Eine Bilanz politischer Reformen in Nordafrika, Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Sankt Augustin 2005. 
46  The Egyptian agricultural exports into the EU increased by 70 per cent in 2005, 
from € 248 million in 2003 to € 404 million since the ratification of the EU-Egypt 
«Association Agreement» in June 2004 (cf. Ahmad A. Namatella, «EU Agricultural 
Commissioner Urges Egyptian Exporters to Focus on Quality», in: The Daily Star 
Egypt, December 5, 2006). The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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celona Declaration and the clause which states “the right of each of them to 
choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic, and 
judicial system”
47, the Egyptian regime developed its own way by selling 
the domestic reform agenda of gradualism as truly in the spirit as laid down 
in the Declaration but nonetheless coming from within, while viewing rela-
tionships with the EU primarily in donor-recipient terms. With the policy 
shift taken place and the stricter, more rigorous, and more specific national 
approach of the ENP, the strategy of the last decade seems to be outdated. 
It may be argued that on behalf of the Egyptian side the potential scope of 
the relationship that is offered from the EU, going beyond the donor-
recipient relationship of the past, has not been acknowledged yet. It is go-
ing to be difficult – the regime is certainly aware of this – to continue the 
selling of reform as true liberalization following the spirit of EU principles 
as having done at its best during the first decade of the EMP. This explains 
the diplomatic manoeuvres during the negotiations for the «Action Plan» 
and the wish of the regime to keep it low on the agenda in the semi-official 
press and public debate at least until the second half of 2006.
48 Interested in 
gaining more partners and diversifying its economic potential to attract 
FDI, Egypt is currently much engaged in furthering and strengthening eco-
nomic ties with China, Russia and other economic power weights in Asia.
49 
Egypt follows a strict modus to enhance economic growth on which the 
whole political elite is dependent and its eroding legitimization based on.
50 
It explains the strategy to diversify its economic partners but as well the 
wish to diversify external dependencies. Simply counting on the EU would 
make the ruling elite vulnerable, thus seeking for other trading partners in 
 
47  «The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Barcelona Declaration», in: <http://europa. 
eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm> (November 10, 2006). 
48  Cf. Mohamed Amin al-Masri, «Mubarak yazuru madinat al-Qarna», in: al-Ahram, 
June 13, 2006. 
49   Ahmed Namatella, «Business Recap», in: The Daily Star Egypt, September 29, 
2006; Hadia Mostafa, «If Every Chinese Just Bought One Orange», in: BT-
Business Today Egypt, vol. 12, n°10, October 2006; Hadia Mostafa, «The New 
China Syndrom», in: BT-Business Today Egypt, vol. 12, n°11, November 2006. 
50  Egypt needs an annual growth of at least six per cent in order to create enough new 
jobs and to adapt to the growing work force of its young population.  Thomas Demmelhuber 
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the Eastern hemisphere, who do not ask critical questions for instance 
about the human rights accord, has topped the agenda. 
Secondarily, post-9/11 has been shaped by various multi- and unilateral 
attempts to overcome the authoritarian strip stretching from the Western 
part of the Arab world to the Eastern part of the «Greater (Broader) Middle 
East», which is also composed of countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, and 
the Caucasus Region. Based on the normative agenda of democracy, the 
latter has lost much of its credibility on the ground for democratic advo-
cates in Egypt yearning for an opening-up of the system. Moreover democ-
racy has developed into a murky bubble with numerous interpretations. 
There are many languages of democracy as “democracy by nature allows 
for different visions and perspectives”
51, but any western-inspired attempt 
of enhancing and supporting democratic reform processes is currently 
doomed to fail and therefore being in part a welcome opportunity for the 
incumbent regimes to present themselves as the guardian of stability and 
reliance in cooperation with their Western partners and to present them-
selves as the reliable advocate of gradual reform.
52 Hamzawy is right by 
arguing that “discussing prospects for democratic reform in Egypt necessi-
tates addressing the minefield of Western democracy promotion and articu-
lating preferences about it.”
53 The vivid «duckling» of the West in terms of 
the unsolved democracy vs. stability dilemma have damaged the credibility 
of democracy. Authoritarian regimes all across the Arab world feel more 
self-confident than ever in their approach of gradual reform and their rejec-
tion of any external demands.
54  
 
51  Emad El-Din Shahin, «Egypt’s Moment of Reform – A Reality or an Illusion?», in: 
CEPS Policy Brief, n°78/July 2005, Brussels, p. 6. 
52   Cf. Larbi Sadiki, The Search for Arab Democracy. Discourses and Counter-
Discourses, London 2004, pp. 47ff.; Michelle Pace, «Imagining Co-presence in 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of Dialogue», in: Mediterranean Politics, 
vol. 10, n°3, November 2005, pp. 291-312. 
53    Amr Hamzawy, «Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Democratic Reform in 
Egypt: Contemporary Policy Debates», in: Youngs / Fernandez, The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade [Fn. 12], p. 133. 
54  Cf. for the shift away from democracy promotion on behalf of US foreign policy, 
Michael Slackman, «News Analysis: Rice Speaks Softly in Egypt», in: International 
Herald Tribune, January 15, 2007. The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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Coherence of Instruments and Strategies 
Former attempts of the EU as a foreign policy actor were regularly mis-
shaped by a lack of coherence regarding the normative agenda and the 
eventual  instruments set up to achieve those objectives on the ground. 
Starting in 1995 with a highly ambitious multilateral and bilateral agenda to 
reshape its relations towards the South, the EU had to admit soon that the 
regional approach to the MPCs was too early to embark on, due to the on-
going high level of inter-state conflicts and the fact that the EMP was 
somehow hijacked by the latter. Focusing on bilateral approaches to its 
immediate neighbours or so-called «semi-periphery» (by not rejecting the 
multilateral track), the ENP in the Southern Mediterranean is a rational 
consequence of one decade EMP and its rather poor record. The inclusion 
of the Eastern «semi-periphery» or vice versa is no contradiction to the lat-
ter, due to its common denominator by sharing a common border with the 
EU. This overall security-related approach has to be diversified into coun-
try-specific approaches if it wants to be efficient on the ground. The shift 
from negative conditionality towards positive conditionality has equipped 
EU’s foreign policy with more coherence. It may act as an instrument of 
real incentives and an instrument that shows potential of sustainable use by 
the EU in contrast to the previous instrument of negative conditionality that 
exists only in theory. The implementation and the leverage of positive con-
ditionality will show the potential difference compared to the previous in-
strument of negative conditionality. Certainly it is no self-fulfilling 
prophecy that positive conditionality will change the EU’s stance towards 
Egypt as it might end up like the instrument of negative conditionality.
55 
Nonetheless, the strict EU approach during the negotiations for the «Action 
Plan» have given a clear hint of increased commitment by the EU to match 
words with deeds.  
Eventually the latter instrument does not solve the problem of boosting 
sub-regional (here: South-South) integration, so crucial for the realization 
of the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone by 2010. Keeping this in mind, we 
must conclude that there is not only the need of coherence within the ENP 
 
55  Cf. Fn. 10. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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but also the need of an inter-instrumental coherence between the EMP and 
the ENP. The decision to use the subcommittee of the established «Asso-
ciation Councils» for the «Action Plans’» evaluation does not solve the 
problem, due to its remaining bilateral approach. In order to obtain coher-
ence between ENP and the EMP, there should be an additional unifying 
instrument bringing together all «Action Plans» under one umbrella. Serv-
ing as a non-binding instance to evaluate the conclusions of all country-
specific evaluations, it would enhance intra-regional competition, public 
visibility, and possibly public debate. Last but not least it would enhance 
the multilateral track.
56  
In the long run, coherence of EU instruments is essential in narrowing per-
ception gaps, which to overcome is so crucial. Certainly in the case of 
Egypt, complex domestic, regional, and international settings influence the 
furtherance of the reform process. Keeping in mind that external input is 
dependent on domestic issues and vice versa one must emphasize the ne-
cessity of a coherent approach with  an inclusive social dimension. The 
complementary approach of the ENP towards the South has sent a clear 
message to the Southern partners’ governments but the message to the peo-
ple has not yet been heard. The EU is willing – of course primarily for the 
sake of its own interests, namely stability and security – to embark on a 
mutual partnership with the ruling elites. This willingness is based on the 
commitment towards more reform leading to an opening-up of the political 
systems on behalf of the MPCs. Actions on the ground must be a mirror of 
the agenda in order to sharpen the European Union’s identity and thus in 
the long run to tackle the perception gap. Coherence of strategies and in-
struments must also imply to further strengthen the social dimension, the 
visibility of the EU agenda, and the dual mutual partnership with the ruling 
elites and the people on both sides of the Mediterranean. Relying simply on 
 
56  One might think of an instrument similar to the «Peer Review Mechanism» under 
the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) framework of the African 
Union. NEPAD, launched in July 2001, has succeeded in pushing forward Africa’s 
development agenda in international relations. Its drafted political and economic 
programme identifies the promotion of democracy, rule of law, good governance, 
human rights as the most crucial indicators of the continent’s development agenda. The ENP and its Implementation in the Southern Mediterranean 
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the ruling elite will not be sufficient to achieve the coherence between 
strategies and instruments on the ground.
57 
Finally, based on positive conditionality as a leading principle in EU-
Egyptian relations, the social dimension should be upgraded by diversify-
ing the partners in Egypt. The choice of potential partners in politics, busi-
ness, and society shall not be restricted to regime loyalists and western-
educated civil society actors in order to mirror the socio-political composi-
tion of Egyptian society. This would comprise the cooperation with repre-
sentatives of Political Islam (here: Muslim Brotherhood)
58 as the dominant 
socio-political force in Egyptian society and on behalf of the EU it would 
convey a clear message:  
“Democracy assistance does not focus on determining outcomes but on nurtur-
ing democratic culture, practices, and institutions.”
59 
 
57  There are indeed promising developments underway. The Muslim Brotherhood par-
liamentary bloc of 88 members met the EU parliament’s delegation at the bloc’s 
headquarter in Cairo on November 22, 2006. The willingness to engage moderate 
voices of political Islam that recognize and abide by the principles of democracy is 
the right strategy to get more social visibility as the Muslim Brotherhood is one of 
the strongest socio-political movements in the country (cf. Press release by Muslim 
Brotherhood on Friday, November 24, 2006, in: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com> 
(November 27, 2006); Alaa el-Ghatrifi, «Wa qad al-barlaman al-urubbi yazuru 
nuwwab al-ihkwan fi maqarri-him bi-l-Manyal», in: al-Masri al-Yowm, November 
11, 2006). 
58  It shall be a partial inclusion of those actors adhering to the basic principles of po-
litical participation, i.e. taking actively part in Egyptian politics through elections, 
socio-political movements, syndicates, unions or associations. 
59  Gershman / Allen, «The Assault on Democracy Assistance», in: Journal of Democ-
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